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A simple unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment protocol via quantum
teleportation∗
Horace P. Yuen†
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering,
Department of Physics and Astronomy, Northwestern University, Evanston, IL 60208
By using local quantum teleportation of a fixed state to one qubit of an entangled pair sent from the
other party, it is shown how one party can commit a bit with only classical information as evidence
that results in an unconditionally secure protocol. The well-known “impossibility proof” does not
cover such protocols due to its different commitment and opening prescriptions, which necessitate
actual quantum measurements among different possible systems that cannot be entangled as a
consequence.
It is nearly universally accepted that unconditionally
secure quantum bit commitment is impossible due to en-
tanglement cheating. For a brief summary of the prob-
lem and further references to the literature, see Ref. [1].
In this paper, a concise self-contained description of a
protocol belonging to what we call Type 5 QBC proto-
cols, is presented together with a security proof. Such
protocols are based on two-way quantum and classical
communications within the framework of ordinary quan-
tum mechanics, without the use of additional constraints
such as relativity or super-selection rules, and in which
only classical information is committed as evidence. The
preliminary protocol QBC5p is a two-stage protocol in
which Babe sends Adammany maximally entangled pairs
of qubits Hℓ1 ⊗ Hℓ2, ℓ ∈ {1, . . . , n}, on each of which a
unitary transformation Uℓk unknown to Adam has been
applied to Hℓ1. Adam picks one pair Hℓ¯1⊗Hℓ¯2 and tele-
ports to Hℓ¯1 one of two known orthogonal states in H3
corresponding to the bit value b = 0 or 1, and commits
the Bell-basis measurement result on Hℓ¯2⊗Hℓ¯3 to Babe.
He opens by sending Hℓ¯1 and the remaining n− 1 qubit
pairs to Babe, who verifies by making the corresponding
projection measurements. This protocol is ǫ-concealing
and can be extended to an ǫ–binding one, QBC5, in a se-
quence. The reasons underlying the success of this pro-
tocol will be explained in this paper. But the drastic
difference between this protocol and the ones covered by
the “impossibility proof” (IP) should be evident. Aside
from details, the main step of QBC5 outlined above is
quite simple, as is the idea behind it which is the reverse
of the usual formulation: measurement result committed
and quantum state given at opening instead of state com-
mitted and measurement result given at opening. The
teleportation prevents Adam from entangling the open-
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ing possibilities.
Consider first the case of a single qubit pair. Starting
from a fixed openly known, say, Ψ−12 ≡ 1√2 (| ↑〉1| ↓〉2 −
| ↓〉1| ↑〉2), Babe applies a unitary Uk known only to
herself to H1, and sends the resulting H1 ⊗ H2 in state
Ψk ≡ (Uk ⊗ I)Ψ−12 to Adam. If Adam measures the Bell
basis
Ψ± ≡ 1√
2
(| ↑〉| ↓〉 ± | ↓〉| ↑〉),
Φ± ≡ 1√
2
(| ↑〉| ↑〉 ± | ↓〉| ↓〉)
on H2⊗H3 for any state |φ〉 on H3, he would obtain each
result i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, with probability 14 corresponding to
Ψ± and Φ±, with resulting state in H1 given by:
Ukσi|φ〉 (1)
where σi are given by σ1 = −σz, σ2 = −σ0 = −I, σ3 =
−iσy, σ4 = σx in terms of the Pauli spin operators. Let
{|0〉, |1〉} be an openly known orthonormal basis of a
qubit. To commit b = 0 or 1, Adam may use |φ〉 = |b〉
on H3 and obtains Ukσi|b〉 on H1 from (1), announcing i
to Babe as the committed evidence. He opens by claim-
ing b and sending H1 to Babe, who verifies by measuring
the one-dimensional projection of the state Ukσi|b〉. It
is evident that the protocol is perfectly concealing if she
does not entangle the possible Uk: with orthogonal states
|i〉 representing the classical information committed by
Adam, ρB0 = ρ
B
1 = |i〉〈i|. Thus, her conditional probabil-
ities for optimally estimating the bit b on the basis of the
committed evidence i are p(b|i) = 14 for both b = 0, 1.
For the corresponding binding proof of the situation in
which Adam opens one bit value perfectly, say opening
b = 0 with probability 1, we will first show that Adam
cannot cheat perfectly, i.e., his optimal cheating proba-
bility P
A
c of opening b = 1 instead is bounded away from
1. This can be seen by exhausting all of his possible ac-
tions. First note that there is no entanglement possibility
for him either over the single state |b〉, or over the classi-
cal information i even if it is represented by |i〉, as only a
specific i is accepted as legitimate. In order to cheat per-
fectly, Adam has several courses of action left. The first
one is for him to teleport |0〉 to Ukσi|0〉 and then apply
2some V A to try changing it to Ukσi|1〉. Another is for
him to announce some i without a Bell measurement and
perform the teleportation on some |φ〉 ∈ H3 with result j
when he opens b, applying some V A to H1 to obtain the
proper opening state. The third is just sending some |φ〉
back to Babe and try to open correctly. Finally, he may
try to determine Uk. In the first case, his probability of
successful cheating is given by, for a given i,
PAc (1) =
∑
k
λk|〈1|σ†iU †kV AUkσi|0〉|2 (2)
where λk is probability that Uk was employed by Babe.
To obtain PAc = 1, one would need each of the terms
in the sum of (2) to be one, which is impossible if {Uk}
is properly chosen, in particular if it is {I, Rx, Ry, Rz}
where Rx is the rotation about the xˆ-axis of the qubit by
an angle π/2 in its Bloch-sphere representation, etc.,
{Uk} = {I, Rx, Ry, Rz}. (3)
This is due to the fact that for each Uk, there are only one
possible rotations V A that makes |〈1|σ†iU †kV AB Ukσi|0〉|2 =
1 and there is no common rotation that works for all k. In
the second situation the successful cheating probability
is, for a given pair (i, j) and a given b,
PAc (2) =
∑
k
λk|〈b|σ†iU †kV AUkσj |φ〉|2. (4)
Again, equation (4) cannot be made equal to 1 with (3)
similar to the case of (2). In the third case,
PAc (3) =
∑
k
λk|〈b|σ†iU †kV A|φ〉|2, (5)
which clearly cannot be 1 as V A|φ〉 is independent of k.
Note that the last two courses of action actually do not
allow him to open b = 0 perfectly already. Also, other
{Uk} can be used in lieu of (3).
Note the role of the classical evidence i and the role
of Babe’s application of Uk in preventing Adam’s per-
fect cheating. Note also that Adam has no entanglement
cheating, in contrast to the IP formulation. To summa-
rize, Adam’s optimum cheating probability is some fixed
number P
A
c = pA < 1 for perfect b=0 opening. The
exact value of pA depends on the set {Uk} and its proba-
bility distribution, and can be determined by solving the
optimization problems corresponding to his possible ac-
tions described above. But there is no need to determine
this value for the purpose of proving the possibility of
obtaining unconditionally secure protocols.
Babe may entangle over the possible Uk so that she
keeps HC and sends H1 ⊗ H2 for |Ψ〉 ∈ HC ⊗ H1 ⊗ H2
with |fk〉 orthonormal in HC ,
|Ψ〉 =
∑
k
√
λk|fk〉(Uk ⊗ I)|Ψ−12〉. (6)
In this situation, one can cast the protocol in the IP for-
mulation for a fixed Bell-measurement result i known to
both parties by combining (1) and (6), and the proto-
col is not perfectly concealing. If Adam commits only
a partial Bell-measurement result, the protocol can still
be cast in the IP formulation if he only makes the par-
tial (degenerate) Bell-measurement, and not the full one,
and then randomizes. To obtain ǫ-concealing, one can
employ the following strategy — Babe sends Adam an
ordered sequence of n qubit pairs {Hℓ1 ⊗Hℓ2}, each en-
tangled in the form (6) with λℓk =
1
4 , |fℓk〉 ∈ HCℓ , and{Uℓk} given by (3). Adam randomly picks one of these
pairs, Hℓ¯1 ⊗ Hℓ¯2, and performs the quantum teleporta-
tion. He commits the result i of the Bell-measurement
as evidence, but not the name of the pair or Hℓ1 itself.
He opens by sending in Hℓ¯1 and all the other n− 1 qubit
pairs. Babe verifies by measuring the projections onto
Uℓ¯kσi|b〉 on Hℓ¯1 (or the projection onto (6) in HCℓ ⊗Hℓ1),
and (Uℓk ⊗ I)|Ψ−ℓ12〉 on the other pairs.
If Babe entangles pair by pair, it is easily seen that this
preliminary protocol QBC5p is ǫ-concealing, as Babe has
probability 1
n
of guessing the correct HC
ℓ¯
for entangle-
ment cheating to obtain a cheating probability P¯Bc >
1
2 .
If she does not guess correctly, her cheating probability
is 12 as shown above. Thus, her optimum P¯
B
c ≤ 12 + 12n .
If Babe entangles over all the pairs, a calculation similar
to that of Section IV in Ref. [3] shows that, conditioned
on any of Babe’s measurement results on her ancilla, the
same bound on P¯Bc applies. This also follows from the
fact that pair-by-pair entanglement is entirely general in
the present case. See also Appendix A of this paper. At
the same time, Adam cannot cheat perfectly by opera-
tion on Hℓ¯1 as above, and he cannot entangle the differ-
ent possibilities of using any of the n qubit pairs to ob-
tain i — due to the verification proecedure he could use
only one qubit pair for teleportation. One cannot entan-
gle the different possibilities involving measurements and
no-measurements on different state spaces. A classical
measurement result is to be obtained, by Babe and thus
on Adam’s qubits too, even if Adam does not perform
the measurement himself and just sends her a quantum
state representing the result. The impossibility proof as-
sumes that all opening possibilities can be purified in an
entanglement without a proof that it is true in all possi-
ble situations. The above protocol provides an example
for which such an assumption is not valid.
Thus far the “impossibility proof” has already been
contradicted, since it asserts [1] that whenever the proto-
col is ǫ-concealing, i.e., Babe’s optimum cheating prob-
ability is P
B
c ∼ 12 , then P
A
c ∼ 1 even in the situation
when he opens b=0 perfectly. If the b=0 perfect open-
ing condition is relaxed, Adam has more possible actions
open to him. Exhaustively, they can be described by the
following and their combinations: approximate cloning
of Ψk, using different states than |b〉 on H3, announc-
ing a different i from his Bell measurement, opening by
sending a different qubit from H1 to Babe, and simply
announcing a different bit value at opening. Two of these
are already included in the above analysis. By continuity
of all relevant functions on a finite-dimensional space, it
3is readily seen that if Adam opens on b=0 with proba-
bility PA(0) = 1 − δ1, then he can cheat no better than
P
A
c = pA + δ2 with limδ1→0 δ2 = 0. While the optimum
P
A
c for arbitrary PA(0) remains to be determined, there
is no need to include it here as there does not seem to be
much interest in protocols where both PA(0) and PA(1)
are not close to 1. In any event, the optimum tradeoff
between PA(0) and PA(1) may be determined and the av-
erage probability of opening correctly to Adam’s choice
can be brought down to arbitrarily small level similar to
the following PA(0) = 1 case.
Protocol QBC5’ is obtained when the above QBC5p is
repeated in a sequence of N such n-pairs, each consist-
ing of the above protocol step with the same b opening.
Adam’s cheating probability P¯Ac = p
N
A can be made arbi-
trarily small for large N . Babe’s entanglement of the Nn
pairs clearly does not help her cheat as she is left with
the same small probability of matching the correct HC
ℓ¯
to the announced i. However, her P¯Bc is improved by the
N repetitions, but it can be made arbitrarily small for
any fixed N by making n large. The quantitative treat-
ment of a similar situation has been given in Section VI
of Ref. [4]. The key point is that Adam’s optimal cheat-
ing probability does not keep increasing with N , so that
arbitrarily large N can be used to reduce P¯Bc to any level
without corresponding increase in P¯Ac . Thus, the proto-
col QBC5 is ǫ-concealing and ǫ-binding for any desired
ǫ > 0.
So far we have allowed Adam to cheat during both
commitment and opening but assumed that Babe is hon-
est in sending Adam the “legal” states. Honesty during
commitment in a multi-stage protocol is an assumption
of the “impossibility proof,” which has to be relaxed for
a truly secure protocol. In QBC5, Babe can cheat by,
e.g., sending |ψk〉|ψk〉, an unentangled state in H1 ⊗H2,
so that the Bell measurement probability on |ψk〉|b〉 in
H2⊗H3 depends on b. This kind of cheating, sending in
a different state other than one allowed in a multi-stage
protocol, can be handled in two different ways in general
that also apply effectively to the “impossibility proof”
formulation for certain protocols. The first way is to let
one party send in a large number of the allowed states
so that the other party can check for honesty on most of
them and then use the rest. In the present case, Babe
would send Adam a large number M of pairs, so Adam
can set aside m≪M of them, and asks Babe for the ex-
act state in the other M −m pairs. With or without her
entanglement over such pairs, Babe has to tell exactly
what each state is, which Adam can verify by a projec-
tion measurement. With M sufficiently large, it may be
shown that the probability that any of the m remaining
states is not a legal one allowed by the protocol, up to
entanglement by Babe, given allM−m are, can be made
arbitrarily small for any m. The detailed analysis of this
approach for the present problem is given in Appendix A
of this paper.
What if Babe is found cheating during such testing?
Clearly, one party can always refuse to cooperate in any
protocol, which is what repeated cheating and getting
caught amounts to. It does not alter the fact that the pro-
tocol allows arbitrarily small cheating probability. One
meaningful way to deal with repeated cheatings appli-
cable to realistic environments is to allow a fixed num-
ber nc of cheating detection, beyond which the cheating
party is taken to be the loser in an essentially classical
game-theoretic formulation. The above N -ensemble can
be generalized to deal with such a formulation, but it is
conceptually simpler to have the following explicit game-
theoretic formulation, our second way to handle the use
of non-allowed states during commitment. In such a for-
mulation, there is no N -ensemble sent simultaneously.
Only one pair is sent, but the other party has a large
probability of choosing to check the validity of that state
instead of going further with the protocol. During the
successive trials, the other party may decide at any point
to stop checking and accept the state. It is clear that
with potentially an unlimited number of trials, the prob-
ability of successfully sneaking in a nonallowed state can
be made arbitrarily small for any fixed nc. With nc set
to be zero, essentially no cheating can be attempted at
all without undue risk of losing the game. A quantita-
tive description of this approach is given in Appendix
B of this paper. Note that neither of these approaches
is needed if one adopts the IP assumption that Babe is
honest in submitting only legal states of the protocol to
Adam.
With either of these two ways, one can safely be as-
sured that the parties are honest during the exchanges of
states or quantum communications in the commitment
phase of a multi-stage protocol, as was assumed in the
“impossibility proof” formulation. Under this condition,
we have completed the concealing and binding proof of
the following simplification of the above protocol QBC5’.
PROTOCOL QBC5
(i) Babe sends Adam nN modified singlet pairs
(Uℓk ⊗ I)Ψ
−
ℓ12, Ψ
−
ℓ12 ∈ Hℓ1 ⊗ Hℓ2, ℓ ∈
{1, . . . , nN}, named by their positions, with
each Uℓk, k ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}, randomly drawn from
{Uℓk} = {I,Rx, Ry, Rz}, the R’s being π/2 rota-
tions about the qubit axes.
(ii) Adam teleports the state |b〉 for the bit b he
wants to commit to n randomly selected pairs
among the nN ones, committing to Babe the
Bell-measurement results im, m ∈ {1, . . . , n}
without the corresponding names of the pairs.
(iii) Adam opens by sending {Hm1} and all the other
pairs together with their names to Babe, who ver-
ifies by corresponding measurements.
To recapitulate the main reason for the security of
QBC5: one cannot purify the different possibilities of
measuring different components of a tensor product space
4while leaving the remaining part of the space untouched.
In QBC5, the tensor product space is
⊗
ℓ(Hℓ1 ⊗ Hℓ2)
and the different components are Hℓ1⊗Hℓ2 indexed by ℓ.
Adam cannot entangle the different possible actual mea-
surements, and if he does not actually measure, he could
not open b = 0 perfectly corresponding to the committed
i, which Babe could measure for him anyway in case he
just sends her the register containing the information i.
In addition to teleportation, it is shown in Ref. [5] that
the use of a split entangled pair can yield an uncondition-
ally secure protocol. A general discussion on the scope
of the “impossibility proof” is given in Ref. [2] together
with the security proofs of several other protocols.
APPENDIX A: HONESTY GUARANTEE FROM
AN ENSEMBLE
One general approach to guarantee with probability
arbitrarily close to 1 that a party B is sending a “le-
gal” state from {ψk} allowed by the protocol, or at least
sending the entangled superposition
|Ψ〉 =
∑
k
λk|ψk〉B|fk〉C (A1)
for orthonormal |fk〉C ∈ HC , is the following. She sends
in N states, each randomly drawn independently from
the given allowed set {ψk} and named, say, by its tem-
poral position. The other party A randomly picks N −n
of such states and asks B to reveal them. After verifying
that they are correct, the probability that all n remaining
states are at least of the form (A1) can be made arbitrar-
ily close to 1 by proper choice of n, N as follows.
Suppose B mixes in states ψ′ that allows her to cheat
with probability P¯Bc − 12 ≥ ǫ for a given ǫ. Then the
cheating detection probability δ = 1 − |〈ψ′|ψk〉|2 > 0
minimized over the choice of k and ψ′ is a fixed number
dependent only on ǫ and the protocol, independent of n
and N . Suppose B mixes in m such ψ′ out of the N
states she sends to A. We grant that B’s cheating is
successful if there is just one copy of ψ′ in the n-group
untested by A and the measurements by him reveals no
different states from {ψk}. In order that there is a non-
vanishing probability found in the random n-group that
A sets aside, m/N must be non-vanishing with m/N → p
in the limitN →∞. Let α ≡ n/N so that asymptotically
for large N,α is the fraction of states among the N set
aside. In order for B to be able to cheat, one has mα ≥ 1
for large N because mα is the average number of ψ′ in
the n-group. The probability that the cheating detection
fails in the N − n group is then
(1 − δ)m(1−α) ≤ (1− δ) 1−αα → 0, (A2)
which can be made arbitrarily small by having α arbi-
trarily small that obtains with N →∞ for fixed n. This
argument can be completely quantified via the hyper-
geometric distribution and the Chernov bound without
passing to the limit N →∞, although the limiting argu-
ment suffices for the present purpose.
In QBC4, a simple modification is needed, in which
Adam would need Babe to send him HBβ together with
the exact {|fk〉} for checking that the states are indeed
|Ψµ〉|Ψν〉 of the form (1).
When the number of states {|ψk〉} is equal to or larger
than the dimension of the state space HB sent to Adam,
an entanglement of the form (A1) for each member of the
ensemble is entirely general. Any other entanglement
can be obtained by local transformation on HC . This
situation covers all our applications.
The use of this method suffers from two disadvan-
tages compared to the next one in Appendix B via game-
theoretic checking, but has the advantage that no game
payoffs need to be imposed. The first disadvantage is
that one needs to make sure that the evaluation of P¯A
from Babe’s ensemble takes into account the possibility,
depending on the |ψk〉’s, that Adam may be able to de-
termine it exactly with a nonzero probability. Of course,
since he usually has to return the unused one for Babe’s
verification, such a strategy may not improve his P¯Ac . In
our qubit formulation such possibility indeed does not
arise.
The second disadvantage is that this approach gives
Adam an ensemble of choice for each individual |ψk〉 he
is going to operate upon, thus the opportunity of entan-
glement. Thus, one has to deal with such entanglement
possibility explicitly. This possibility does not exist in
QBC5, which is indeed the reason why it is secure as
elaborated in this paper. It does not exist in QBC4 be-
cause it is perfectly concealing, but it does in our QBC1
and QBC2 which are dealt with in Ref. [5].
APPENDIX B: HONESTY GUARANTEE IN A
GAME-THEORETIC FORMULATION
During the commitment phase of a multi-stage QBC
protocol involving exchanges of quantum states, a party
can try to cheat by using “illegal” states not allowed in
the protocol. In the “impossibility proof”, this problem
is not tackled by assuming each party is honest, which is
an unreasonable assumption in a protocol that precisely
does not place trust in either party. It turns out, however,
that a simple classical game formulation can take care of
this problem, up to entanglement of legal states, in the
following way.
Suppose B is giving A a quantum system in possible
allowable states {ψk}, to be further processed by A. To
make sure that the state is legal with a probability ar-
bitrarily close to 1, A can ask B to reveal the state and
check it by corresponding projection measurement. The
cheating detection probability is denoted by pd, which
is determined by the illegal states ψ′ used by Babe that
would allow her to cheat beyond ǫ, P
B
c − 12 ≥ ǫ. After
checking, the whole protocol would need to be repeated
up to that point, but there is no question of resource or
5efficiency in the present context.
Assuming first that the allowable number of cheats is
nc = 0, i.e., if B is found cheating the game is over
and B will be declared the loser. Such a situation oc-
curs, e.g., when the penalty of being found cheating is
arbitrarily large. We let A employ a randomized strat-
egy with a probability pa of accepting B’s state without
checking, independently from trial to trial without loss
of generality in this case. Thus B’s strategy can also
be represented by a probability pc of cheating at each
trial. In an indefinitely long sequence of trials, B’s suc-
cessful cheating probability PC can be found as follows.
The probability B will succeed at the first trial is pcpa,
at the second is pcpa(1 − pa − pcpd), and at the nth is
pcpa(1−p a−pcpd)n−1. Thus, the total successful cheat-
ing probability after n trials is
PC(n) =
pa
pa + pd
[1− (1− pcpa − pcpd)n]. (B1)
Similarly, the probability that a legal state is accepted
after n trials is
PA(n) =
pa(1 − pc)
pa(1− pc) + pcpd
×[1− (1 − pa + papc − pcpd)n], (B2)
and the probability a cheating would be detected is
PD(n) =
pcpd
pa + pcpd
[1− (1− pa − pcpd)n]. (B3)
Observing that for fixed pd > 0, PD(n)→ 0 is equivalent
to pc → 0 from (B3). We have
lim
PD→0
n→∞
PC(n) = 0, (B4)
lim
PD→0
n→∞
PA(n) = 1. (B5)
With a large penalty for cheating, PD would be driven
to zero from minimizing the average penalty. Hence pc
and PC are also driven to zero, as expected, with PA →
1. Even if no penalty is imposed, PC(n) may be made
arbitrarily small for any pc > 0 by making n large and
pa/pd small from (B1), while the corresponding PA(n)
needs not be close to 1. Since a party has to cooperate
and accept a protocol if his/her security is guaranteed, as
formalized by the “Intent Principle” of ref [6] on protocol
agreement, B must pick a small pc to accept a viable
protocol in this situation.
With nc > 0 but finite, the same situation as above
arises after nc − 1 detections of cheating, which would
occur with probability arbitrarily close to 1 for a long
enough number n′ of trials. It is also possible for A to ter-
minate the game at any point by accepting the state after
a fixed number of trials na. Even though a more compli-
cated optimal strategy that is trial stage-dependent for
either party would then emerge, it would go over to the
above for large n.
If {ψk} is the set of allowable states, this procedure
only assures that the state ψ ∈ HB ⊗ HC that B sends
in is of the form
|ψ〉 =
∑
k
λk|ψk〉B|fk〉C (B6)
for orthonormal |fk〉 ∈ HC . Often B cannot cheat al-
ready in such a case as the Type 5 ones in this paper,
although in general B may still be able to cheat using
(B6). In some situations, as in QBC4 of Ref. [5], one
party may be asked to entangle as in (B6) and later send
in HC for the other party to verify the total entangled
state.
In the full unconditionally secure protocol that requir-
ing a sequence, the above game can be repeated succes-
sively one by one. The levels of each probability (B1)-
(B3) can be adjusted to accommodate the desired level
on the overall probabilities for the n-sequence.
The generality of the entanglement (B6) for our pro-
tocols, as well as advantages and disadvantages of this
game-theoretic approach versus the ensemble approach,
are briefly discussed in the above Appendix A.
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